Stay Great To Be A Surfer, No?
- HMARK
- Posts: 2322
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- Location: Between Heaven & Earth
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Stay Great To Be A Surfer, No?
Ok, I figger this belongs in the off topic page, but I will let the Budster be the end judge of that.
Was thinking (!) Ouch!~ that kinda hurts right off the bat, 'bout OUR little slice of heaven that we got going on here. No swells notwithstanding, we got the goods going pretty damn good I f i can say so. Yeah, we got da paradise tax, the traffic, the crowds, the BS in da lineup, and a host of other BS, but, for me, and anyone else who like say 'em... It NO STAY TOO BAD, eh? I dont like the high price of paradise, or the influx of big $ too our aina, but if you had anywhere else to exsist, where would you go?
I cant think of anywhere else, off hand.
Sure, we gots da bummers with the crowds, but who neva get couple good days with the wonder - "where da hell is everybody?" shit going on?
The reason I was wondering all this BS, is when I look at our world, and the shit on the TV, our "leaders", ETC.... There has gotta be a reasonable way for these FUCKERS to all get along. I mean, seriously, we are sending our youth to go die, in country that gives not a shit about the USA, and then ya got doofus' terrorizing prisoners, and towel heads cutting off a bruddahs head?
They all should go surfing, tell me the shit would not end.
'Cause they all be hunting waves instead of each other.
Take care of your keiki, and teach 'em well. Give 'em a open mind, and an open heart.
Even if you no agree with the powers that be, pray for those who sacrifice for our freedom.
It is freedom to SURF.
Peace. Please.
Was thinking (!) Ouch!~ that kinda hurts right off the bat, 'bout OUR little slice of heaven that we got going on here. No swells notwithstanding, we got the goods going pretty damn good I f i can say so. Yeah, we got da paradise tax, the traffic, the crowds, the BS in da lineup, and a host of other BS, but, for me, and anyone else who like say 'em... It NO STAY TOO BAD, eh? I dont like the high price of paradise, or the influx of big $ too our aina, but if you had anywhere else to exsist, where would you go?
I cant think of anywhere else, off hand.
Sure, we gots da bummers with the crowds, but who neva get couple good days with the wonder - "where da hell is everybody?" shit going on?
The reason I was wondering all this BS, is when I look at our world, and the shit on the TV, our "leaders", ETC.... There has gotta be a reasonable way for these FUCKERS to all get along. I mean, seriously, we are sending our youth to go die, in country that gives not a shit about the USA, and then ya got doofus' terrorizing prisoners, and towel heads cutting off a bruddahs head?
They all should go surfing, tell me the shit would not end.
'Cause they all be hunting waves instead of each other.
Take care of your keiki, and teach 'em well. Give 'em a open mind, and an open heart.
Even if you no agree with the powers that be, pray for those who sacrifice for our freedom.
It is freedom to SURF.
Peace. Please.
~ God created surfboards so the truly gifted would not rule the world ~
sorry, i can't feel the gratitude right now. kinda hard when our "beds are burning".
not one, but two people from my section are going to iraq.
yeah, it's great to be a surfer.
but this is not the time to be a soldier. and not a good time to be an american. the world hates us. we detaqin others without due process, degrade them. how in the heck can we say we stand for human rights???
don't get me wrong. the only solution i see is genocide. it's too far gone. gottaake that area glow in the dark...
not one, but two people from my section are going to iraq.
yeah, it's great to be a surfer.
but this is not the time to be a soldier. and not a good time to be an american. the world hates us. we detaqin others without due process, degrade them. how in the heck can we say we stand for human rights???
don't get me wrong. the only solution i see is genocide. it's too far gone. gottaake that area glow in the dark...
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- Joined: Thu Apr 15, 2004 3:19 pm
From http://www.infoplease.com (internet dictionary):
ter•ror•ism
Pronunciation: (ter'u-riz"um), [key]
—n.
1. the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, esp. for political purposes.
2. the state of fear and submission produced by terrorism or terrorization.
3. a terroristic method of governing or of resisting a government.
By definition we, Americans, have become what we so largely fear, terrorists by the actions of President George W. Bush.
I agree that it is a great time to be a surfer and it is an even greater time to be isolated on our little island like we are....but the reality is young men are dying for a lost cause.
I, myself, often indulge in the 'ignorance is bliss' mindset, especially when the surf is firing or when there is war coverage on CNN, but I watch the NBA playoffs instead.
ter•ror•ism
Pronunciation: (ter'u-riz"um), [key]
—n.
1. the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, esp. for political purposes.
2. the state of fear and submission produced by terrorism or terrorization.
3. a terroristic method of governing or of resisting a government.
By definition we, Americans, have become what we so largely fear, terrorists by the actions of President George W. Bush.
I agree that it is a great time to be a surfer and it is an even greater time to be isolated on our little island like we are....but the reality is young men are dying for a lost cause.
I, myself, often indulge in the 'ignorance is bliss' mindset, especially when the surf is firing or when there is war coverage on CNN, but I watch the NBA playoffs instead.
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- Posts: 1527
- Joined: Tue Feb 17, 2004 1:11 pm
Its too late ,the world and the earth have been ruined by technology.
If you want peace and utopia you gotta go live in in the bush in a non arab 3rd world country and never watched the t.v., or touch a computer again.
we definatley live in the best state of america.
Thank god for the waves to take us away from the madness.
Bush is slepping with the Saudis !!!!
who's responsible for 911 ?
Saudis.
Bin Ladens family was allowed to leave the US on 9/12.
How fucked up is this country we live in ?
Innocent young american men and women are dying for US, you and I.
It makes me ill, and I am so thankful that I go to sleep in my own bed and not in the giant kitty litter box of Iraq.
They are making the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq to protect our country, citizens and values.
God bless them. and pray for surf.
If you want peace and utopia you gotta go live in in the bush in a non arab 3rd world country and never watched the t.v., or touch a computer again.
we definatley live in the best state of america.
Thank god for the waves to take us away from the madness.
Bush is slepping with the Saudis !!!!
who's responsible for 911 ?
Saudis.
Bin Ladens family was allowed to leave the US on 9/12.
How fucked up is this country we live in ?
Innocent young american men and women are dying for US, you and I.
It makes me ill, and I am so thankful that I go to sleep in my own bed and not in the giant kitty litter box of Iraq.
They are making the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq to protect our country, citizens and values.
God bless them. and pray for surf.
- Kelly7873
- Posts: 1046
- Joined: Wed Feb 18, 2004 12:37 pm
- Location: Kailua
LGREANZ wrote:Bush is slepping with the Saudis !!!!
who's responsible for 911 ?
Saudis.
Bin Ladens family was allowed to leave the US on 9/12.
How fucked up is this country we live in ?
The Bush family is in the oil business, of course they do business with the Saudis. Should we attack Saudi Arabia because the 911 terrorists came from there?
Bin Laden has 51 siblings and who knows how many cousins. His family has denounced him since 1991. I'm sure the FBI are investigating the Bin Laden family but should we have locked then all up just for being related to him?
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that was me that said that, maleko. and yes, if someone beheaded a loved one of mine, i would grieve, indeed. you wouldn't? what a NON-caring individual...
i believe, since they don't like to be embarased by naked pictures, that we should treat our iraqi prisoners the same way they treated ours: DECAPITATE THEM ALL. howz dat?
maleko, rather than go back and forth on this one again, i'll take this opportunity to declare that i will NEVER AGAIN, post on this website.
see how strong and bad you are? you won, dipshit... bravo.
i believe, since they don't like to be embarased by naked pictures, that we should treat our iraqi prisoners the same way they treated ours: DECAPITATE THEM ALL. howz dat?
maleko, rather than go back and forth on this one again, i'll take this opportunity to declare that i will NEVER AGAIN, post on this website.
see how strong and bad you are? you won, dipshit... bravo.
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- HMARK
- Posts: 2322
- Joined: Tue Feb 17, 2004 11:30 am
- Location: Between Heaven & Earth
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Arggg.
I do not want to pit anyone against anyone else here, gangy. Just stoked on what we have, not to take it forgranted, and appreciate what we have.
Thank God we are allowed to have opposing views. And we hopefully respect those who differ from our own.
I, personally, would not join the armed forces. BUT i do admire anyone who is willing to sacrfice sense of self for the good of our way of life.
War sucks. Any 442nd old timer can relate to that. It isnt any better due to high tech. It is still death. Still young souls sacrificing under the wants and needs of those who are not on the line of fire.
My naivete may be a bit pronounced on this one, Sorry. Surfing may or may not be the answer for everybody to lay down hate, fear and predjudice, but maybe it could be a start.
Just thinking out loud, the voices in my head refuse to shut up.
Peace.
Thank God we are allowed to have opposing views. And we hopefully respect those who differ from our own.
I, personally, would not join the armed forces. BUT i do admire anyone who is willing to sacrfice sense of self for the good of our way of life.
War sucks. Any 442nd old timer can relate to that. It isnt any better due to high tech. It is still death. Still young souls sacrificing under the wants and needs of those who are not on the line of fire.
My naivete may be a bit pronounced on this one, Sorry. Surfing may or may not be the answer for everybody to lay down hate, fear and predjudice, but maybe it could be a start.
Just thinking out loud, the voices in my head refuse to shut up.
Peace.
~ God created surfboards so the truly gifted would not rule the world ~
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- Posts: 7
- Joined: Thu Apr 15, 2004 3:19 pm
maleko wrote:you're never posting again?... we'll see.
I would care if a loved 1 of mine was murdered.
i'm was just saying that the "kill 'em all" post is the exact reason why so many foriegn countries hate us (America) because of our arrogant, selfish attitudes.
^^^
This coming from a man who, not but 2 months ago, said he could careless about a young haole female being lost at sea near V-land.
Maleko, you are a hypocrite.
Here's a link to the beheading(I will never watch it):
http://www.entensity.net
But here's a good read that might make you think twice about the video:
http://infowars.com/print/iraq/berg.htm
I like the read, makes me want to watch the video...but I just can't let myself watch it.
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- Joined: Tue Feb 17, 2004 1:11 pm
I think when those Saudia Arabian hijackers flew those planes into those buildings they ruined it for the entire arab world.
We should've kicked them ALL out of our country, and never let another into our country.
Kelly Can u explain it to me why Bin Ladens family was allowed to fly home when all air travel was halted after 911, and thousands of americans were stranded in foreign countries trying to get back to America?
Its because the The bush family is corrupt, and he got them outta there ASAP cause they've been linning the bush familys pockets since George Bush Senior was vice president to Regan.
G.W. Bush's grandfather was in business with Nazis when they were gassing the Jews.
BASICALLY THE BUSH FAMILY SUCKS
We are being dupped folks. We dont even know 25 % of the truth.
We should've kicked them ALL out of our country, and never let another into our country.
Kelly Can u explain it to me why Bin Ladens family was allowed to fly home when all air travel was halted after 911, and thousands of americans were stranded in foreign countries trying to get back to America?
Its because the The bush family is corrupt, and he got them outta there ASAP cause they've been linning the bush familys pockets since George Bush Senior was vice president to Regan.
G.W. Bush's grandfather was in business with Nazis when they were gassing the Jews.
BASICALLY THE BUSH FAMILY SUCKS
We are being dupped folks. We dont even know 25 % of the truth.
- Kelly7873
- Posts: 1046
- Joined: Wed Feb 18, 2004 12:37 pm
- Location: Kailua
LGREANZ wrote:Kelly Can u explain it to me why Bin Ladens family was allowed to fly home when all air travel was halted after 911, and thousands of americans were stranded in foreign countries trying to get back to America?
I can explain it very easily. It's a lie made up by Michael Moore. The Saudi government arranged for a couple of flights but those fights took place on Sep 18 and 19 which was after the ban was lifted.
I'm not a Bush lover, in fact I think I disagree with all most every position he has. The terribly pessimistic about winning the war in Iraq but it's not because I think Bush is evil and is out trying to line his own pockets.
BTW, Kerry scares me even more the Bush.
- Puerto_Rico_Surfer
- Posts: 673
- Joined: Tue Apr 13, 2004 3:45 pm
- Location: Puerto Rico
- Contact:
Only 9 more days and I'll be in Hawaii pray for surf next week hey Neal please keep up the photos and stories I enjoy them-- you too Bud, cya in a week n / half.
Talking about death and war, I was watching a documentary of behind the scenes the other night of a war correspondent "imbedded" with a platoon of marines as they were conducting operations in Fallujah, and the thing that hit me the most was the correspondent pointed out of the 15 or so guys he was with 6 were gone within 2 days (2 killed and 4 off to hospitals in Germany) while talking to one of the 9 left the guy made a comment-- "The thing that sucks most about dying is it starts out like every other normal day" in a real matter of fact voice----the point i guess i am trying to make is the soldiers have already accepted that their ticket is basically up and they are just passing time. Death in the group is not considered an abnormality, they basically expect every day now is their last, you could see it in this guys eyes as he said it.
I know this doesnt have anything to do with surfing but I thought u guys might find this interesting, its from a free newsletter I receive weekly, from a psuedo CIA type intelligence gathering thinktank the website is stratfor.com
Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.
THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
11 May 2004
The Edge of the Razor
Summary
The strategy of the United States in its war with radical Islam is in a state
of crisis. The global strategic framework is in much better shape than the
tactical situation in the Iraq theater of operations -- but this is of only
limited comfort to Washington because massive tactical failure in Iraq could lead to strategic collapse. The situation is balanced on the razor's edge. The United States could recover from its tactical failures, or suffer a
massive defeat if it fails to do so. One thing is certain: The United States
cannot remain balanced on the razor's edge indefinitely.
Analysis
Most wars reach a moment of crisis, when the outcome hangs in the balance and in which weakness and errors, military or political, can shape victory or put it permanently out of reach. Sometimes these moments of crisis come suddenly and are purely military, such as the Battle of Midway. Sometimes they are a long time brewing and are primarily political in nature, like the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. These are moments when planning, judgment and luck can decide victors -- and when bad planning, lack of judgment and bad luck can undermine the best and brightest. It is the moment when history balances on the razor's edge. The U.S.-Islamist war is now, it seems to us, balanced on that edge.
There are some who argue that it is not reasonable to speak of the
confrontation between the United States and al Qaeda as a war. It certainly does not, in any way, resemble World War II. It is nevertheless very much a war. It consists of two sides that are each making plans, using violence and attempting to shape the political future of a major region of the globe --the Muslim world. One side masses large forces, the other side disperses much smaller forces throughout the globe. But the goals are the goals of any war: to shape the political future. And the means are the same as in any war: to kill sufficient numbers of the enemy in order to break his will to fight and resist. It might not look like wars the United States has fought in the past, but it is most certainly a war -- and it is a war whose outcome is in doubt.
On a strategic level, the United States has been the victor since the Sept.
11 attacks. Yet strategic victories can be undermined by massive tactical
failures, and this is what the United States is facing now. Iraq is a single
campaign in a much broader war. However, as frequently occurs in wars,
unintended consequences dominate the battlefield. The United States intended to occupy Iraq and move on to other campaigns -- but failures in planning, underestimation of the enemy and command failures have turned strategic victory into a tactical nightmare. That tactical nightmare is now threatening to undermine not only the Iraqi theater of operations, but also the entire American war effort. It is threatening to reverse a series of al Qaeda defeats. If the current trend continues, the tactical situation will undermine U.S. strategy in Iraq, and the collapse of U.S. strategy in Iraq could unravel the entire U.S. strategy against al Qaeda and the Islamists. The question is whether the United States has the honesty to face the fact that it is a crisis, the imagination to craft a solution to the problems in Iraq and the luck that the enemy will give it the time it needs to regroup.
That is what war looks like on the razor's edge.
The Strategic Situation
In the midst of the noise over Iraq, it is essential to grasp the strategic
balance and to understand that on that level, the United States has done
relatively well. To be more precise, al Qaeda has done quite poorly. It is
one of the paradoxes of American war-fighting that, having failed to
articulate coherent goals, the Bush administration is incapable of pointing
to its real successes. But this is an excruciatingly great failure on the
part of the administration. It was Napoleon who said, "The moral is to the
physical as 3-1," by which he meant that how a nation or army views its
successes is more important than what its capabilities are. The failure to
tend to the morale of the nation, to articulate a strategy and demonstrate
progress, is not a marginal failure. It is the greatest possible failure of
political leadership in wartime.
Nevertheless al Qaeda has failed in its most fundamental goal. There has been no mass rising in the Islamic world, nor has a single Muslim government fallen. Nor, for that matter, has a single Islamic government shifted its position in support of al Qaeda. To the contrary, a series of Muslim governments -- the most important of which is Saudi Arabia -- have shifted their positions toward active and effective opposition to al Qaeda. The current attacks by al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia are a reflection of the shift in Saudi policy that has occurred since just before the invasion of Iraq.
Saudi Arabia is far from the only country to have shifted its strategy. Iran
-- for all of its bombast -- has, through complex back-channel negotiations
with the United States as well as a complex re-evaluation of its strategic
position, changed its behavior since January 2002. Syria, while still not
fully in control, has certainly become more circumspect in its behavior.
Prior to the Iraq war, these governments ranged from hostile to
uncooperative; they since have shifted to a spectrum ranging from minimally cooperative to fully cooperative.
Since the United States could not hunt down al Qaeda, cell by cell and
individual by individual, it devised an alternative strategy that is less
effective in the short run but more effective in the long run -- and the only
strategy available. Washington sought to change the behavior of enabling
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, by making the potential threat from the United States greater than the potential threat from al Qaeda. By occupying Iraq and surrounding Saudi Arabia with military forces, the United States compelled a reluctant and truculent Riyadh to comply with American wishes.
In the long run, changes in the behavior of these governments -- and of other Muslim governments, from Islamabad to Tripoli -- represent the only way to defeat al Qaeda. To the simplistic American question of, "Are we safer today than we were a year ago?" the answer is, "Probably not." To the question of whether the United States is on a path that might make it safer in five years, the answer is "Probably yes," assuming the U.S. effort doesn't collapse under the weight of its pyramiding mistakes in Iraq.
We would argue that the political shifts in the Muslim world that have helped the United States were aided significantly by the invasion of Iraq. We would certainly agree that Islamic opposition to the United States solidified -- we doubt that there was much room for intensification -- but we would also argue that opinion is significant to the extent to which it turns into war-fighting capability. The Poles despised the Germans and the Japanese were not fond of the Americans, but neither could expel the occupier simply on the strength of public opinion. It is the shifts in government policy that contained radical Islamist tendencies that should be the focal point, and the invasion of Iraq served that purpose.
Tactical Failures?
It is at that point that things started to go wrong -- not with the grand
strategy of the United States, but with the Iraq strategy itself. A string of
intelligence failures, errors in judgment and command failures have conspired to undermine the U.S. position in Iraq and reverse the strategic benefits.
These failures included:
* A failure to detect that preparations were under way for a guerrilla war in the event that Baghdad fell.
* A failure to quickly recognize that a guerrilla war was under way in Iraq,
and a delay of months before the reality was recognized and a strategy
developed for dealing with it.
* A failure to understand that the United States did not have the resources
to govern Iraq if all Baathist personnel were excluded.
* A failure to understand the nature of the people the United States was
installing in the Iraqi Governing Council -- and in particular, the complex
loyalties of Ahmed Chalabi and his relationship to Iraq's Shia and the
Iranian government. The United States became highly dependent on individuals about whom it lacked sufficient intelligence.
* A failure to recognize that the Sunni guerrillas were regrouping in
February and March 2004, after their defeat in the Ramadan offensive.
* Completely underestimating the number of forces needed for the occupation of Iraq, and cavalierly dismissing accurate Army estimates of what is need in the field of operations in favor of lower estimates that rapidly became unsupportable.
* Failing to step up military recruiting in order to increase the total
number of U.S. ground forces available on a worldwide basis. Failing to
understand that the difference between defeating an army and occupying a country had to be made up with ground forces.
These are the particular failures. The general failures are a compendium of every imaginable military failing:
* Failing to focus on the objective. Rather than remembering why U.S. forces were in Iraq and focusing on that, the Bush administration wandered off into irrelevancies and impossibilities, such as building democracy and eliminating Baath party members. The administration forgot its mission.
* Underestimating the enemy and overestimating U.S. power. The enemy was intelligent, dedicated and brave. He was defending his country and his home.
The United States was enormously powerful but not omnipotent. The casual dismissal of the Iraqi guerrillas led directly to the failure to anticipate and counter enemy action.
* Failure to rapidly identify errors and rectify them through changes of
plans, strategies and personnel. Error is common in war. The measure of a military force is how honestly errors are addressed and rectified. When a command structure begins denying that self- evident problems are facing them, all is lost. The administration's insistence over the past year that no fundamental errors were committed in Iraq has been a cancer eating through all layers of the command structure -- from the squad to the office of the president.
* Failing to understand the political dimension of the war and permitting
political support for the war in the United States to erode by failing to
express a clear, coherent war plan on the broadest level. Because of this
failure, other major failures -- ranging from the failure to find weapons of
mass destruction to the treatment of Iraqi prisoners -- have filled the space that strategy should have occupied. The persistent failure of the president to explain the linkage between Iraq and the broader war has been symptomatic of this systemic failure.
Remember the objective; respect the enemy; be your own worst critic; exercise leadership at all levels -- these are fundamental principles of warfare. They have all been violated during the Iraq campaign.
The strategic situation, as of March 2004, was rapidly improving for the
United States. There was serious, reasonable discussion of a final push into Pakistan to liquidate al Qaeda's leadership. Al Qaeda began a global
counterattack -- as in Spain -- that was neither unexpected nor as effective as it might have been. However, the counterattack in Iraq was both unexpected and destabilizing -- causing military and political processes in Iraq to separate out, and forcing the United States into negotiations with the Sunni guerrillas while simultaneously trying to manage a crisis in the Shiite areas. At the same time that the United States was struggling to stabilize its position in Iraq, the prison abuse issue emerged. It was devastating not only in its own right, but also because of the timing. It generated a sense that U.S. operations in Iraq were out of control. From Al Fallujah to An Najaf to Abu Ghraib, the question was whether anyone had the slightest idea what they were trying to achieve in Iraq.
Which brings us back to the razor's edge. If the United States rapidly
adjusts its Iraq operations to take realities in that country into account,
rather than engaging on ongoing wishful thinking, the situation in Iraq can
be saved and with it the gains made in the war on al Qaeda. On the other
hand, if the United States continues its unbalanced and ineffective
prosecution of the war against the guerrillas and continues to allow its
relations with the Shia to deteriorate, the United States will find itself in
an untenable position. If it is forced to withdraw from Iraq, or to so limit
its operations there as to be effectively withdrawn, the entire dynamic that
the United States has worked to create since the Sept. 11 attacks will
reverse itself, and the U.S. position in the Muslim world -- which was fairly
strong in January 2004 -- will deteriorate, and al Qaeda's influence will
increase dramatically.
The Political Crisis
It is not clear that the Bush administration understands the crisis it is
facing. The prison abuse pictures are symptomatic -- not only of persistent
command failure, but also of the administration's loss of credibility with
the public. Since no one really knows what the administration is doing, it is
not unreasonable to fill in the blanks with the least generous assumptions.
The issue is this: Iraq has not gone as planned by any stretch of the
imagination. If the failures of Iraq are not rectified quickly, the entire
U.S. strategic position could unravel. Speed is of the essence. There is no
longer time left.
The issue is one of responsibility. Who is responsible for the failures in
Iraq? The president appears to have assumed that if anyone were fired, it
would be admitting that something went wrong. At this point, there is no one who doesn't know that many things have gone wrong. If the president insists on retaining all of his senior staff, Cabinet members and field commanders, no one is going to draw the conclusion that everything is under control; rather they will conclude that it is the president himself who is responsible for the failures, and they will act accordingly.
The issue facing Bush is not merely the prison pictures. It is the series of
failures in the Iraq campaign that have revealed serious errors of judgment and temperament among senior Cabinet-level officials.
We suspect that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is finished, and with him Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.
Vice President Dick Cheney said over the weekend that everyone should get off of Rumsfeld's case. What Cheney doesn't seem to grasp is that there is a war on and that at this moment, it isn't going very well. If the secretary of defense doesn't bear the burden of failures and misjudgments, who does? Or does the vice president suggest a no-fault policy when it comes to war? Or does he think that things are going well?
This is not asked polemically.
It is our job to identify emerging trends, and
we have, frequently, been accused of everything from being owned by the
Republicans to being Iraq campaign apologists. In fact, we are making a non- partisan point: The administration is painting itself into a corner that will cost Bush the presidency if it does not deal with the fact that there is no one who doesn't know that Iraq has been mismanaged. The administration's only option for survival is to start managing it effectively, if that can be done at this point.
Talking about death and war, I was watching a documentary of behind the scenes the other night of a war correspondent "imbedded" with a platoon of marines as they were conducting operations in Fallujah, and the thing that hit me the most was the correspondent pointed out of the 15 or so guys he was with 6 were gone within 2 days (2 killed and 4 off to hospitals in Germany) while talking to one of the 9 left the guy made a comment-- "The thing that sucks most about dying is it starts out like every other normal day" in a real matter of fact voice----the point i guess i am trying to make is the soldiers have already accepted that their ticket is basically up and they are just passing time. Death in the group is not considered an abnormality, they basically expect every day now is their last, you could see it in this guys eyes as he said it.
I know this doesnt have anything to do with surfing but I thought u guys might find this interesting, its from a free newsletter I receive weekly, from a psuedo CIA type intelligence gathering thinktank the website is stratfor.com
Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.
THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
11 May 2004
The Edge of the Razor
Summary
The strategy of the United States in its war with radical Islam is in a state
of crisis. The global strategic framework is in much better shape than the
tactical situation in the Iraq theater of operations -- but this is of only
limited comfort to Washington because massive tactical failure in Iraq could lead to strategic collapse. The situation is balanced on the razor's edge. The United States could recover from its tactical failures, or suffer a
massive defeat if it fails to do so. One thing is certain: The United States
cannot remain balanced on the razor's edge indefinitely.
Analysis
Most wars reach a moment of crisis, when the outcome hangs in the balance and in which weakness and errors, military or political, can shape victory or put it permanently out of reach. Sometimes these moments of crisis come suddenly and are purely military, such as the Battle of Midway. Sometimes they are a long time brewing and are primarily political in nature, like the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. These are moments when planning, judgment and luck can decide victors -- and when bad planning, lack of judgment and bad luck can undermine the best and brightest. It is the moment when history balances on the razor's edge. The U.S.-Islamist war is now, it seems to us, balanced on that edge.
There are some who argue that it is not reasonable to speak of the
confrontation between the United States and al Qaeda as a war. It certainly does not, in any way, resemble World War II. It is nevertheless very much a war. It consists of two sides that are each making plans, using violence and attempting to shape the political future of a major region of the globe --the Muslim world. One side masses large forces, the other side disperses much smaller forces throughout the globe. But the goals are the goals of any war: to shape the political future. And the means are the same as in any war: to kill sufficient numbers of the enemy in order to break his will to fight and resist. It might not look like wars the United States has fought in the past, but it is most certainly a war -- and it is a war whose outcome is in doubt.
On a strategic level, the United States has been the victor since the Sept.
11 attacks. Yet strategic victories can be undermined by massive tactical
failures, and this is what the United States is facing now. Iraq is a single
campaign in a much broader war. However, as frequently occurs in wars,
unintended consequences dominate the battlefield. The United States intended to occupy Iraq and move on to other campaigns -- but failures in planning, underestimation of the enemy and command failures have turned strategic victory into a tactical nightmare. That tactical nightmare is now threatening to undermine not only the Iraqi theater of operations, but also the entire American war effort. It is threatening to reverse a series of al Qaeda defeats. If the current trend continues, the tactical situation will undermine U.S. strategy in Iraq, and the collapse of U.S. strategy in Iraq could unravel the entire U.S. strategy against al Qaeda and the Islamists. The question is whether the United States has the honesty to face the fact that it is a crisis, the imagination to craft a solution to the problems in Iraq and the luck that the enemy will give it the time it needs to regroup.
That is what war looks like on the razor's edge.
The Strategic Situation
In the midst of the noise over Iraq, it is essential to grasp the strategic
balance and to understand that on that level, the United States has done
relatively well. To be more precise, al Qaeda has done quite poorly. It is
one of the paradoxes of American war-fighting that, having failed to
articulate coherent goals, the Bush administration is incapable of pointing
to its real successes. But this is an excruciatingly great failure on the
part of the administration. It was Napoleon who said, "The moral is to the
physical as 3-1," by which he meant that how a nation or army views its
successes is more important than what its capabilities are. The failure to
tend to the morale of the nation, to articulate a strategy and demonstrate
progress, is not a marginal failure. It is the greatest possible failure of
political leadership in wartime.
Nevertheless al Qaeda has failed in its most fundamental goal. There has been no mass rising in the Islamic world, nor has a single Muslim government fallen. Nor, for that matter, has a single Islamic government shifted its position in support of al Qaeda. To the contrary, a series of Muslim governments -- the most important of which is Saudi Arabia -- have shifted their positions toward active and effective opposition to al Qaeda. The current attacks by al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia are a reflection of the shift in Saudi policy that has occurred since just before the invasion of Iraq.
Saudi Arabia is far from the only country to have shifted its strategy. Iran
-- for all of its bombast -- has, through complex back-channel negotiations
with the United States as well as a complex re-evaluation of its strategic
position, changed its behavior since January 2002. Syria, while still not
fully in control, has certainly become more circumspect in its behavior.
Prior to the Iraq war, these governments ranged from hostile to
uncooperative; they since have shifted to a spectrum ranging from minimally cooperative to fully cooperative.
Since the United States could not hunt down al Qaeda, cell by cell and
individual by individual, it devised an alternative strategy that is less
effective in the short run but more effective in the long run -- and the only
strategy available. Washington sought to change the behavior of enabling
countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, by making the potential threat from the United States greater than the potential threat from al Qaeda. By occupying Iraq and surrounding Saudi Arabia with military forces, the United States compelled a reluctant and truculent Riyadh to comply with American wishes.
In the long run, changes in the behavior of these governments -- and of other Muslim governments, from Islamabad to Tripoli -- represent the only way to defeat al Qaeda. To the simplistic American question of, "Are we safer today than we were a year ago?" the answer is, "Probably not." To the question of whether the United States is on a path that might make it safer in five years, the answer is "Probably yes," assuming the U.S. effort doesn't collapse under the weight of its pyramiding mistakes in Iraq.
We would argue that the political shifts in the Muslim world that have helped the United States were aided significantly by the invasion of Iraq. We would certainly agree that Islamic opposition to the United States solidified -- we doubt that there was much room for intensification -- but we would also argue that opinion is significant to the extent to which it turns into war-fighting capability. The Poles despised the Germans and the Japanese were not fond of the Americans, but neither could expel the occupier simply on the strength of public opinion. It is the shifts in government policy that contained radical Islamist tendencies that should be the focal point, and the invasion of Iraq served that purpose.
Tactical Failures?
It is at that point that things started to go wrong -- not with the grand
strategy of the United States, but with the Iraq strategy itself. A string of
intelligence failures, errors in judgment and command failures have conspired to undermine the U.S. position in Iraq and reverse the strategic benefits.
These failures included:
* A failure to detect that preparations were under way for a guerrilla war in the event that Baghdad fell.
* A failure to quickly recognize that a guerrilla war was under way in Iraq,
and a delay of months before the reality was recognized and a strategy
developed for dealing with it.
* A failure to understand that the United States did not have the resources
to govern Iraq if all Baathist personnel were excluded.
* A failure to understand the nature of the people the United States was
installing in the Iraqi Governing Council -- and in particular, the complex
loyalties of Ahmed Chalabi and his relationship to Iraq's Shia and the
Iranian government. The United States became highly dependent on individuals about whom it lacked sufficient intelligence.
* A failure to recognize that the Sunni guerrillas were regrouping in
February and March 2004, after their defeat in the Ramadan offensive.
* Completely underestimating the number of forces needed for the occupation of Iraq, and cavalierly dismissing accurate Army estimates of what is need in the field of operations in favor of lower estimates that rapidly became unsupportable.
* Failing to step up military recruiting in order to increase the total
number of U.S. ground forces available on a worldwide basis. Failing to
understand that the difference between defeating an army and occupying a country had to be made up with ground forces.
These are the particular failures. The general failures are a compendium of every imaginable military failing:
* Failing to focus on the objective. Rather than remembering why U.S. forces were in Iraq and focusing on that, the Bush administration wandered off into irrelevancies and impossibilities, such as building democracy and eliminating Baath party members. The administration forgot its mission.
* Underestimating the enemy and overestimating U.S. power. The enemy was intelligent, dedicated and brave. He was defending his country and his home.
The United States was enormously powerful but not omnipotent. The casual dismissal of the Iraqi guerrillas led directly to the failure to anticipate and counter enemy action.
* Failure to rapidly identify errors and rectify them through changes of
plans, strategies and personnel. Error is common in war. The measure of a military force is how honestly errors are addressed and rectified. When a command structure begins denying that self- evident problems are facing them, all is lost. The administration's insistence over the past year that no fundamental errors were committed in Iraq has been a cancer eating through all layers of the command structure -- from the squad to the office of the president.
* Failing to understand the political dimension of the war and permitting
political support for the war in the United States to erode by failing to
express a clear, coherent war plan on the broadest level. Because of this
failure, other major failures -- ranging from the failure to find weapons of
mass destruction to the treatment of Iraqi prisoners -- have filled the space that strategy should have occupied. The persistent failure of the president to explain the linkage between Iraq and the broader war has been symptomatic of this systemic failure.
Remember the objective; respect the enemy; be your own worst critic; exercise leadership at all levels -- these are fundamental principles of warfare. They have all been violated during the Iraq campaign.
The strategic situation, as of March 2004, was rapidly improving for the
United States. There was serious, reasonable discussion of a final push into Pakistan to liquidate al Qaeda's leadership. Al Qaeda began a global
counterattack -- as in Spain -- that was neither unexpected nor as effective as it might have been. However, the counterattack in Iraq was both unexpected and destabilizing -- causing military and political processes in Iraq to separate out, and forcing the United States into negotiations with the Sunni guerrillas while simultaneously trying to manage a crisis in the Shiite areas. At the same time that the United States was struggling to stabilize its position in Iraq, the prison abuse issue emerged. It was devastating not only in its own right, but also because of the timing. It generated a sense that U.S. operations in Iraq were out of control. From Al Fallujah to An Najaf to Abu Ghraib, the question was whether anyone had the slightest idea what they were trying to achieve in Iraq.
Which brings us back to the razor's edge. If the United States rapidly
adjusts its Iraq operations to take realities in that country into account,
rather than engaging on ongoing wishful thinking, the situation in Iraq can
be saved and with it the gains made in the war on al Qaeda. On the other
hand, if the United States continues its unbalanced and ineffective
prosecution of the war against the guerrillas and continues to allow its
relations with the Shia to deteriorate, the United States will find itself in
an untenable position. If it is forced to withdraw from Iraq, or to so limit
its operations there as to be effectively withdrawn, the entire dynamic that
the United States has worked to create since the Sept. 11 attacks will
reverse itself, and the U.S. position in the Muslim world -- which was fairly
strong in January 2004 -- will deteriorate, and al Qaeda's influence will
increase dramatically.
The Political Crisis
It is not clear that the Bush administration understands the crisis it is
facing. The prison abuse pictures are symptomatic -- not only of persistent
command failure, but also of the administration's loss of credibility with
the public. Since no one really knows what the administration is doing, it is
not unreasonable to fill in the blanks with the least generous assumptions.
The issue is this: Iraq has not gone as planned by any stretch of the
imagination. If the failures of Iraq are not rectified quickly, the entire
U.S. strategic position could unravel. Speed is of the essence. There is no
longer time left.
The issue is one of responsibility. Who is responsible for the failures in
Iraq? The president appears to have assumed that if anyone were fired, it
would be admitting that something went wrong. At this point, there is no one who doesn't know that many things have gone wrong. If the president insists on retaining all of his senior staff, Cabinet members and field commanders, no one is going to draw the conclusion that everything is under control; rather they will conclude that it is the president himself who is responsible for the failures, and they will act accordingly.
The issue facing Bush is not merely the prison pictures. It is the series of
failures in the Iraq campaign that have revealed serious errors of judgment and temperament among senior Cabinet-level officials.
We suspect that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is finished, and with him Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.
Vice President Dick Cheney said over the weekend that everyone should get off of Rumsfeld's case. What Cheney doesn't seem to grasp is that there is a war on and that at this moment, it isn't going very well. If the secretary of defense doesn't bear the burden of failures and misjudgments, who does? Or does the vice president suggest a no-fault policy when it comes to war? Or does he think that things are going well?
This is not asked polemically.
It is our job to identify emerging trends, and
we have, frequently, been accused of everything from being owned by the
Republicans to being Iraq campaign apologists. In fact, we are making a non- partisan point: The administration is painting itself into a corner that will cost Bush the presidency if it does not deal with the fact that there is no one who doesn't know that Iraq has been mismanaged. The administration's only option for survival is to start managing it effectively, if that can be done at this point.
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